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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The organizational form of a corporation is an 
innovation of the modern era. Dating back to the 
Dutch East India Company in 1602, it enables 
funding from a diverse source of external investors 
supported by limited liability, achieving a form of 
continuous business execution not possible with 
organizations created for each oceanic journey. 
Japanese corporate law – the “Companies Act” in its 
formal name – has been researched from multiple 
viewpoints, but the economic analysis of Japanese 
corporate law, spearheaded by Miwa, Kanda and 
Yanagawa (Eds.) (1998), has been particularly 
extensive.  
This paper’s goal is to explore the behavioural 
aspects of corporate law by drawing on recent 
developments in the field, and so to deepen our 
understanding of the corporate organization. As 
discussed in the next section in more detail, there is 
a gap in the existing literature on the behavioural 
foundations of decision making and the legal 
foundations of corporate governance. While 
corporate decisions are made by individuals or 
groups, with associated behavioural aspects, existing 
research on the design of Japanese corporate law is 
scarce from this perspective and will profit from 
further exploration. By combining the two 
foundations, we should be able to gain greater 
insight into the design of corporate governance. In 
particular, this paper analyses a clause in the 
Companies Act which deals with group decision 
making. Japanese society has many institutions and 
organizations in which group decision making is 
ingrained. The Japanese Cabinet and Diet, for 
example, consist of multiple ministers and 
policymakers. Cases in Japan’s courts of law, 
especially important ones, are deliberated by groups 
of judges. In the Japanese Supreme Court, cases 
must be deliberated by groups of five or fifteen 
judges, and in the High Court by groups of three, 
without exception. Such group decisions seem to fit 
the Japanese corporate culture of nemawashi, the 
internal consensus-building which takes place before 
formal decision making. However, Koike (2009) 
argues that group decision making, while thought of 
as a Japanese tradition, was in fact not a national 
tradition at all. As evidence, he cites cases from as 
far back as the Japanese government’s imperial 
poetry anthology (the “New Collection of Poems 
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Ancient and Modern”) compiled in the early 13th 
century.  
Corporate decision making is governed by the 
Companies Act, within which exists an interesting 
clause which obliges companies to make decisions 
as a group. The corporate law stipulates that “a 
Company with a Board of Directors shall have three 
or more directors” (§ 331 (5)). However, this clause 
has not met with wide acceptance. Egashira (2017), 
referring to the clause, states that “it is not carried 
out as expected by the law…there are many cases 
where a board of directors is a nominal existence to 
meet the required number of people or…just a 
formality”, especially for small and medium-sized 
firms.  
Group decision making is not required for all 
firms, but only for those having a board of directors. 
A board of directors is mandatory for firms which 
issue one or more shares tradable without the 
approval of its issuer. Typically this is a listed firm, 
namely “any Stock Company the articles of 
incorporation of which do not require, as a feature 
of all or part of its shares, the approval of the Stock 
Company for the acquisition of such shares by 
transfer” (§ 2 (5)). Unlisted, family-owned, small and 
medium-sized firms which issue shares with 
restrictions on their trade are not required to have a 
board of directors. But there are many firms which 
have chosen to do so ever since the era of the older 
corporate law, despite the assertion by Egashira that 
boards tend to be an empty formality. This reflects 
the social perception, stability, and thus the 
popularity of the format.  
Legal institutions, once formulated, evolve 
under path dependency. The history of the clause 
requiring three or more directors dates back to the 
late 19th century, when, in 1882, a draft commercial 
code was written by the German legal scholar 
Hermann Roesler. Roesler had been invited by the 
Japanese government to introduce European 
corporate laws, the most advanced institutions at 
that time, to a Japan which was attempting to 
modernize before the enactment of the first formal 
corporate law, the Commercial Code, in 1899. The 
Roesler draft stipulated that a “shareholders 
meeting shall elect three or more directors from 
shareholders one month before the commencement 
of business” (Draft § 219). While the corporate law 
in France and Germany required only one or more 
directors, the draft set the minimum requirement at 
three, borrowing a concept from English law which 
used a multiple of three (Takada, 2016, 2014). The 
draft was adopted in the Japanese Commercial Code 
in 1899 as “A Company shall have three or more 
directors”, and the rule remains in modern corporate 
law, the Companies Act. The Companies Act itself 
was rewritten in 2006 as a separate entity from the 
Commercial Code, which today governs only general 
rules of commerce.  
Historically, while the Commercial Code 
required a board of directors for all firms 
established under its terms, there was another law, 
aimed mainly at small, unlisted, family-owned firms, 
which offered an alternative organizational form 
with limited liability (the “Limited Liability Company 
Law”). In 2006, however, the alternative law was 
subsumed under the new corporate law – the 
Companies Act – the enactment of which resulted in 
its abolishment and the prohibition of establishing 
new firms under the prior format. Thus, while the 
“boardless” corporation continues to exist as a 
format, its use is limited because of differences in 
the allocation of powers, and also because it is not 
well perceived. Essentially then, only the board of 
directors format remains popular.  
A corporation with a board of directors must 
make key managerial decisions through its board. 
The corporate law stipulates “deciding the execution 
of the operations” (§ 362 (2) (i)) as a power and 
obligation of the board of directors; this includes the 
investment and financing resolutions which are 
major financial decisions under corporate finance 
theory. For example, the board of directors must 
decide on such investment issues as the “disposal of 
and acceptance of assignment of important assets” 
(§ 362 (4) (i)); on debt financing issues such as 
“borrowing in a significant amount” (ibid, (ii)) and 
“important matters regarding the solicitation of 
persons who subscribe for bonds” (ibid, (v)); and on 
equity financing matters such as the issuance of new 
shares and determination of “subscription 
requirements” (§ 201-202). Even though the 
shareholders meeting is the highest decision-making 
body of a corporation, it cannot make resolutions on 
issues for which decisive power is allocated to the 
board of directors (§ 295 (2)). The shareholders 
meeting is empowered to make indirect decisions 
though the appointment of directors at shareholders 
meetings (§ 341), thereby giving substantial 
decision-making power to the board of directors.  
Egashira (2017) states that corporations 
without a board of directors require shareholders-
meeting approval for more issues than companies 
with a board. Included in such issues are approval of 
the transfer of shares with restriction thereof (§ 139 
(1)), determination of price and timing of share 
repurchase (§ 157 (1), § 168 (1)), determination of 
share split (§ 183 (2)), and approval of competition 
and conflicted transactions by a board member (§ 
356 (1)). More fundamentally, unlike in corporations 
with a board of directors, the power of shareholders 
meetings is not limited to issues stipulated in laws 
and articles of incorporation, but extends to every 
corporate issue from the organizational and 
managerial to the administrative (§ 295 (1)). 
Therefore, the power obtained by a board of 
directors through its place in a corporation is 
extensive, and the allocation of powers is different 
in firms with and without a board. It is intriguing to 
find that the Companies Act requires a minimum of 
three persons on a board of directors, rather than 
leaving the decision to the shareholders. 
Why is group decision making required over 
and beyond decisions made by individuals? As the 
old saying goes, two heads are better than one. The 
Japanese say that three people make wisdom, 
meaning that the quality of decision making is 
improved by the diversity of those taking part in it. 
By contrast, we also hear that too many cooks spoil 
the broth, and that (in Japanese) too many captains 
steer the ship up a mountain; both of these sayings 
imply that a variety of views is not necessarily best 
for corporate decision making. In a board setting, 
therefore, the “group” can become a mere formality, 
a selection of relatives and friends brought together 
to satisfy legal requirements. There is a very fine 
line between leadership and dictatorship, creativity 
and conceit, and vision and illusion, but in family 
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firms, the decisions of founders and owners tend to 
matter. This paper explores the rationale of group 
decision making by drawing on the findings of 
behavioural science. Section 2 reviews the literature 
in existing laws and stipulations as well as analyses 
of corporate boards. Section 3 describes the research 
methodology by which this paper analyses the issue 
of Japanese corporate law. Section 4 shows the 
results of this analysis. Section 5 discusses the 
results and examines the effectiveness of group and 
individual decision making. Section 6 concludes the 
paper.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The previous section raised the question of why 
Japanese corporate law obliges firms to make 
decisions collectively even though “two heads are 
better than one” and “too many cooks spoil the 
broth”. In the context of corporate decisions made 
by a board of directors, it asks if there is any 
difference between decision making by plural 
directors and those by an individual director, all 
other conditions being equal. Correspondingly, from 
the viewpoint of governance, the section identified 
two alternative means: governance by shareholders’ 
voting, where the number of board directors can be 
one, or less than the minimum requirement of three, 
and by the appointment of a three-or-more-person 
board of directors. The existence of two different 
governance formats means that corporate law treats 
decisions by individuals and groups differently, and 
the existence of a clause for mandatory group 
decisions seems to imply that group decision 
making is better than that by individuals, and to give 
more discretion to boards having three or more 
people. This is not always the case, however, and 
even the opposite can be true. To consider the point 
further, this section reviews existing corporate laws 
in more detail along with relevant discussions on 
corporate governance.  
 
2.1. Corporate laws on managerial decisions and 
monitoring  
 
2.1.1. Japanese corporate law 
 
First, it is necessary to make the distinction between 
managerial decisions and monitoring as functions of 
the board of directors. For a firm in which 
ownership is separate from management, 
monitoring is required because of the existence of 
informational asymmetry between principal and 
agent, a mechanism which is governed by corporate 
law. Assuming that the CEO is a board member, it is 
reasonable for the board to have plural directors for 
the purpose of monitoring given the conflict of 
interest existing between principal and agent; a 
separate person or organization is desirable as a 
monitor in order to resolve such conflicts. However, 
Japanese corporate law does not seem to require 
plural directors for monitoring alone. The 
Companies Act lists the roles of the board of 
directors, starting with “deciding the execution of 
the operations” (§ 362 (2) (i)) and followed by 
“supervising the execution of the duties by 
directors” (ibid, (ii)). In the case of plural directors, it 
is understood that directors are obliged to monitor 
each other (Kanda, 2017). The argument for more 
independent directors on the board puts the 
emphasis on checks and balances, the need to 
monitor management from an outside perspective 
and protect shareholders from runaway management.  
Obviously, the term “corporate governance” 
implies an element of monitoring in order to secure 
proper business execution while protecting 
shareholders. Firms having a board of directors 
make various choices along with a spectrum of a 
board’s functions, from the management model to 
the monitoring model, and they seem to be 
struggling as to how to strike a fine balance between 
the two boards’ of directors models or at least to 
make the two compatible. Increasing the number of 
independent directors is consistent with 
transitioning from the management model to the 
monitoring model, but for the purpose of 
monitoring, the Companies Act also offers the 
options of a Company with Auditors and a Company 
with Board of Auditors (§ 327 (2)). These systems 
have auditors monitor management, or “audit the 
execution of duties by directors” (§ 381 (1)), by 
separating the roles of directors and auditors. Since 
Japanese corporate law offers two formats – a 
Company with Auditors, with at least one auditor, 
and a Company with Board of Auditors, with a board 
of auditors with at least three auditors and at least 
half of whom must be independent – the minimum 
number per institution is one. Further, it is possible 
for firms with restrictions on the trade of shares not 
to have auditors, in which case direct monitoring by 
shareholders is prescribed (Kanda, 2017; for 
instance, § 357 (1) for the obligation to report to 
shareholders; § 360 (1)-(3) for the shareholders’ 
rights to suspend action by directors). To address 
limits on the power of auditors and duplication of 
the monitoring roles of independent directors and 
auditors, the Act also offers the option of a 
Company with Audit and Supervisory Committee 
(Tanaka, 2017). Under this latter format, introduced 
in 2015, an Audit and Supervisory Committee 
requiring three or more directors, more than half of 
whom must be independent directors, may replace 
the traditional Board of Auditors and thus enable 
firms to do without an auditor. This format 
compares to that of a Company with Nominating 
Committee etc., where a nominating committee and 
a compensation committee are also formed by a 
majority of independent directors: this is the most 
monitoring-enhancing model of a board of directors 
among those available.  
These mechanisms tend to focus on monitoring 
rather than managerial decisions. This paper, by 
contrast, focuses on an aspect of business judgment – 
managerial decisions – rather than monitoring. 
Corporate law includes managerial decisions within 
the scope of a board of directors’ powers. By having 
a board of directors, a firm moves the authority to 
make many important managerial decisions, such as 
borrowing and asset disposition, from shareholders 
to the board of directors.  
Historically, the article covering firms without a 
board of directors originated in the Limited Liability 
Companies Act, a law governing small and medium-
sized firms which was merged into the Companies 
Act in 2006. The managerial authority of firms 
without a board of directors, including those with 
only one director, is narrower than that of firms 
which have a board. Thus firms with only one 
Corporate Board: Role, Duties & Composition / Volume 14, Issue 2, 2018 
 
30 
director have a different allocation of powers than 
those with a full board of directors. In addition to 
differences in the allocation of powers between 
shareholders and the board of directors, there is 
greater social recognition and credibility with the 
corporate format, and greater predictability and 
stability with the accumulation of judicial 
precedents, than under the limited liability company 
format. For small, family-owned firms, such as small 
factories and mom-and-pop stores with owner-
managers – the kind the law seems to have in mind 
as typical of the limited liability company – few 
problems will arise, even though the allocation of 
powers may differ. But for start-ups and venture 
firms, which may rely on outside capital and have 
separate ownership and management, allocation of 
powers does become an issue and one which 
contemporary corporate law does not appear to 
address. Even a new subsidiary or joint venture 
formed by large firms is run with greater 
consistency if kept under the same format as its 
shareholders’ rather than taking the format of a 
traditional mom-and-pop store – especially since the 
directors of a parent firm can be liable for the losses 
of their wholly-owned subsidiaries under the 
amendment made to the Companies Act in 2014 (§ 
362 (4)(vi)). In sum, Japanese corporate law puts the 
burden on firms to have a board of directors with a 
minimum of three directors if they wish to enjoy the 
benefits and stability of the modern corporate 
format.  
In addition to corporate law, it is important to 
understand the rules of the stock exchange in 
general. The listing requirements of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange focus on monitoring functions rather than 
management, and call for either a board of auditors 
with three or more auditors, at least half of whom 
are independent, or a committee consisting of a 
majority of independent directors which includes 
the Company with Audit and Supervisory Committee 
format (in which case the board of auditors is 
replaced by an audit and supervisory committee) 
and a Company with Nominating Committee etc., 
which adds a nominating committee and a 
compensation committee, also consisting of a 
majority of independent directors. In the Corporate 
Governance Code of 2015, the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
(2017, 2015) crystallized the argument for 
strengthening the monitoring function of the board 
of directors by including more independent 
directors, even for firms having a board of auditors. 
This introduced the “comply-or-explain” principle, 
under which firms are required to explain their 
reasons for not having independent directors. From 
the perspective of this paper, this raises such points 
as the effectiveness of self-monitoring when 
compared with third-party monitoring, as well as the 
relative effectiveness of monitoring by one person 
and by a number of people. In any case, corporate 
scandals are commonly observed in firms with large 
boards of directors and auditors. Miyajima and 
Ogawa (2012) point out that having three 
independent directors was hardly effective in the 
accounting fraud case involving Olympus, a major 
camera and endoscope manufacturer. Listing rules 
are in fact calling for a larger monitoring role for 
boards of directors and the inclusion of more 
independent directors on boards.  
For the purpose of monitoring, it would seem 
effective to separate managers from monitors, but 
this will depend on how managers and monitors are 
incentivized and how knowledgeable and informed 
monitors are about the behaviour of managers. For 
instance, some trade groups, such as financial 
brokers, govern themselves in addition to 
undergoing monitoring by authorities because of the 
complex nature of their business. However, 
assuming that it is more effective to separate 
managers and monitors, which is intuitive, whether 
having multiple monitors is more effective is 
another issue. The point is in line with this paper’s 
point of view, namely, whether managerial decisions 
can be made more effectively by plural people rather 
than one, if the task of monitoring is viewed 
similarly to managerial decision making.  
 
2.1.2. U.S. corporate law 
 
In the U.S., Delaware corporate law stipulates the 
minimum size of a board of directors as “one” 
(§141); this is also the case in New York State (§702). 
However, this cannot be taken as direct evidence 
supporting smaller boards, as boards of directors 
have different roles in Japan and the U.S. Above all, 
the U.S. puts greater emphasis on monitoring and on 
having a majority of independent directors. 
Execution of business is delegated to executive 
officers, except in instances of reorganization, such 
as by a merger and acquisition, or the disposition of 
substantial parts of assets. On a U.S. board one is 
unlikely to find a majority of insiders who have been 
promoted internally, the CEO positioned at the top 
of a corporate pyramid backed by a lifetime 
employment system and empowered to make 
business decisions. Also, in regard to the 
relationship between corporate law and exchange 
rules, the NYSE and NASDAQ both require firms to 
have an independent-director majority on their 
boards of directors, as well as an audit committee 
with three or more directors, all of whom must be 
independent. As a consequence, there must be three 
or more directors on the board, which exceeds the 
one-person minimum prescribed in corporate law. 
This shares a perspective with the Japanese Board of 
Auditors format, which requires at least half of 
auditors to be independent. In both cases, apart 
from monitoring, we do not find any clause which 
obliges firms to make group decisions on the 
execution of business.  
Other means of governance that enable 
individual decisions include a multiple voting class 
of shares. Shareholders with this class of share have 
more than one vote per share, giving founders, for 
instance, major decision rights. Japanese corporate 
law has no provision dealing directly with shares of 
this type, but different classes of shares may be 
created by differentiating the number of issued 
shares necessary per vote (§ 188 (3)). At Google, for 
instance, founders are given ten votes per share. 
Firms such as these give preferred decision rights to 
certain individuals, not at the corporate design level 
but at the level of share design. If a certain 
shareholder is allowed to control decisions at a 
shareholders meeting, the highest decision-making 
body of a firm, this means that the firm is organized 
so as to allow, and indeed to expect, decisions to be 
made by an individual or individuals.  
 
Corporate Board: Role, Duties & Composition / Volume 14, Issue 2, 2018 
 
31 
2.2. Review of empirical research 
 
Empirical research on corporate governance 
generally finds a negative relationship between the 
size of the board of directors and firm value. For 
instance, both Yermack (1996) in the United States 
and Guest (2008) in the United Kingdom find 
significant negative correlations between board size 
and Tobin’s q. In Japan, Suzuki and Peng (2000) 
report a significant negative correlation between 
board size and excess stock return.  
Recent Japanese research includes Nakano and 
Nguyen (2012) and Nakano (2017). The latter shows 
a negative correlation between board size and firm 
performance or value. They argue that a larger 
decision-making body leads to the free rider 
problem, higher coordination costs, and risk 
aversion, pointing out “flaws in group decision 
making” in large decision-making bodies unwilling 
and unable to take risks. Nakano (2017) additionally 
finds a negative correlation between the average age 
of the board and firm performance.  
However, firms listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange have an average board size of eight 
persons, and firms with sales of less than 10 billion 
yen (about 90 million dollars) have boards of about 
six persons, so it cannot be argued that the 
Companies Act puts onerous restrictions on large 
listed firms in regard to the minimum size of 
boards. The research mentioned above generally 
uses samples of an average of seven to eleven 
directors per board, which far exceeds the minimum 
of three. Obviously, there is no empirical research on 
firms with boards having one director because such 
firms cannot be listed. The research into correlations 
with board size does not deal with the process of 
decision making, which suggests a need to draw on 
empirical research in behavioural science, as in the 
next section; it does, however, hint at the 
effectiveness of smaller decision-making bodies as a 
general pattern.  
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The previous section showed that there is generally 
a negative relationship between board size and firm 
value as a result of the free rider problem and 
coordination costs. However, the process by which 
value decreases is unclear. To discover why, we need 
to further our analysis of boards of directors by 
drawing on the behavioural foundations of the 
group and individual decisions. This approach 
allows us to examine whether there is any 
reasonable foundation in Japanese corporate law 
which requires a minimum size for boards and 
distinguishes between groups and individuals in 
allocating discretion over decision making. More 
specifically, we discuss the processes of group 
decision making based on empirical behavioural 
science. As behavioural science research directly 
compares individual decisions with group decisions 
and examines the processes by which group decision 
making takes place, its outcomes are very useful.  
First, we look empirically at a positive aspect of 
group decisions, as represented by the concept of 
collective intelligence: a process by which group 
performance exceeds that of individuals, and which 
is embodied in the Japanese adage “three people 
make wisdom”. We then contrast this finding with a 
negative aspect as represented by the concept of 
groupthink, under which the opposite occurs. This, 
too, has an apposite saying in Japanese: “Too many 
captains steer the ship up a mountain”. Significantly, 
bias and other behavioural tendencies are extracted 
in a general form by comparing individuals and 
groups, although these experiments are not 
conducted in business environments. 
The benefits of group decision making are said 
to derive from the synthesis of diverse skills and 
expertise, the result of which should be better 
decisions. It is arguable that combining expertise in 
this way is effective in dealing with complex issues, 
and that group decisions can be appropriate in such 
situations. Large firms need a diversity of knowledge 
on products and services, while in the medical field, 
doctors and technicians often work as teams to 
provide the range of expertise and skills required for 
complex cases. People need the expertise and 
information of others because there is a limit on 
how much knowledge, experience, and memory can 
be held by a single individual. People thus behave 
under bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). People are 
also limited in their cognition and have a tendency 
to forget, which makes it valuable to have other 
people around to notice the unnoticed and look at 
the overlooked.  
Further, when something new is created by 
combining existing things (Schumpeter, 1912), 
blending the knowledge and experience of multiple 
individuals is a source of innovation, bringing in new 
perspectives and expertise and promoting creativity. 
In innovative organizations, Hill and Brandeau 
(2014) emphasize the importance of leadership in 
creating the collaborative environment needed to 
produce diverse ideas and to learn by discovery 
through trial and error. Group decision making can 
also encourage the proactive involvement of 
participants, thus facilitating the execution of 
whatever is decided.  
By contrast, groupthink is a process by which 
the quality of group decision making declines owing 
to strong pressure within the group to conform or to 
an insufficiency of the information required to make 
sound decisions. Related to groupthink are other 
biases, such as diffusion of responsibility, 
polarization, and overconfidence. These negative 
aspects provide behavioural foundations for the free 
rider problem and the higher coordination costs 
suggested in the empirical studies of board size and 
corporate value.  
Finally, to complement the analysis based on 
empirical studies of behavioural science, we further 
construct a theoretical model of decision making so 
as to analyse the consequences of the group and 
individual decisions. This additional approach 
allows us to look at the problem in a different light, 
and to extract different findings from those gained 
from empirical research on decision making; we can 
now examine the corporate governance model from 
multiple perspectives. This is possible because 
behavioural finance models can be described similarly 
to more traditional agency models and asymmetric 
information models (Baker & Wurgler, 2013).  
Findings obtained from both the empirical 
studies and the theoretical model enable us to 
deepen our understanding of the processes, both 
positive and negative, within which a negative 
relationship between board size and corporate value 
is generally observed, and to discuss the 
implications on Japanese corporate law and its 
stipulations on governance structure.  
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4. RESULTS 
 
This section shows the results of the empirical 
studies on positive and negative aspects of group 
and individual decision making and offers a 
theoretical model of the group and individual 
decisions. First, we show findings for collective 
intelligence, then those for groupthink. Finally, we 
construct a decision model.  
 
4.1. Research on positive effects of group decisions 
 
The positive side of group decisions is called 
collective intelligence, as described in the previous 
section, and there is some evidence to suggest it 
exists. Laughlin et al. (2006) show that in the task of 
solving equations using alphabets, groups of three 
to five perform better than individuals or groups of 
two, indicating that groups of at least three are the 
most effective. Tetlock and Gardner (2015) compare 
individual and group performance in political and 
economic forecasting based on information 
gathering. They randomly divided expert forecasters 
into groups and individuals to compare the positive 
effect of exchanging information and views within a 
group on the accuracy of forecasts, along with the 
negative effects of groupthink and intellectual 
negligence. They instructed the groups beforehand 
about the possible drawbacks of working as a group. 
They report that group performance exceeded 
individual performance by 23 per cent. To test for 
the existence of collective intelligence, they 
compared the performance of all participants with 
that of groups and found that the latter exceeded 
the former by 10 per cent. Performance of groups 
comprised only of high-performing individuals 
(“super-teams”) exceeded that of individuals by 50 
per cent.  
Group decision making alleviates the limits on 
time and information which people face under 
bounded rationality. Tetlock and Gardner (2015) cite 
the existence of a shared culture as an observed 
condition for high-performing groups, whose 
members may take care to ask each other if there 
are any points which have been overlooked when 
forecasting through online communications alone. 
Group participants who were uninterested in other 
people performed poorly, while groups of people 
who were confident while willing to listen to others 
performed higher than the sum of the individuals.  
As an important experiment examining 
conditions within groups, Wooley et al. (2010) show 
that the performance of groups of two to five people 
exceeded that of individuals with no significant 
correlation of abilities between groups and the 
individuals within them, a result which suggests the 
existence of collective intelligence. They cite, as 
conditions contributing to improved performance, 
the high social sensitivity of group members, an 
environment in which participants speak equally 
without particular people dominating discussions, 
and a higher ratio of female participants.  
The above empirical research suggests that 
groups can perform better than individuals under 
certain conditions. In the following, we shall see the 
possible negative effects of group decisions.  
 
4.2. Research on negative effects of group decisions 
 
4.2.1. Groupthink 
 
In a seminal experiment by Asch (1951), participants 
were assigned to groups whose other members were 
researchers pretending to be participants. When the 
actual participant was given false answers to 
questions by the pretenders, the actual participant 
would tend to conform to the majority, believing 
even obviously false answers to be true and that he 
or she had not been influenced by the other 
participants. Janis (1972) argues that people are 
vulnerable to pressure to conform, that a strong 
voice creates an atmosphere in which it is difficult 
to offer opposing opinions, and that conformity to 
the opinion leader is the result. The Japanese 
expression “reading the atmosphere” points to a 
consensus-oriented culture amenable to groupthink 
situations where people refrain from any real debate 
or argument. Koriat (2012) shows that groups 
perform more poorly than individuals when one 
subjectively confident individual in the group 
dominates discussions and makes the decisions.  
 
4.2.2. Diffusion of responsibility 
 
Nisbett and Borgida (1975) report an experiment in 
which fifteen participants were made to hear the 
agonized cries of a researcher pretending to be 
overcome with pain. Out of the fifteen, only four 
approached the researcher at once. Five more stood 
up too late to be of any help, while the other six 
remained seated throughout. Kahneman (2011) 
points out the difficulty of educating people about 
such human tendencies due to the reluctance of 
people to accept unwelcome empirical evidence. 
They tend to believe that they, unlike the majority of 
participants, would step up and help. Kurokawa 
(2016) states that, from his experience as chairman 
of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
Investigation Commission of the National Diet of 
Japan, people in Japanese organizations have “low 
morale, no sense of responsibility, and always talk 
about their problems as if they were other 
people’s’”. All of these phenomena derive from a 
diffusion of responsibility.  
Ogura (1999) reports that when Yamato 
Transport, the leading Japanese household delivery 
firm of which he is the founder, proposed switching 
from its traditional business as a wholesale deliverer 
for a major department store to a retail household 
delivery company, the idea was opposed by every 
one of the board’s directors. The first support and 
catalyst for the transformation came from a leader 
of the firm’s labour union, who was “seriously 
worried about a crisis in management”. Ogura, 
similarly to Kurokawa (2017), states that “salaried 
senior managers tend to avoid taking on 
responsibility and follow and conform to others in 
their thoughts and behaviour. They have a strong 
tendency to postpone facing problems, thinking that 
things will work out at some stage anyway”.  
In addition to diffusing responsibility, 
participating in a group leads to the phenomenon of 
free riding. In a situation where participants are not 
fully rewarded for their contribution, they have an 
incentive to take a free ride. They decrease their 
efforts and contribute less to the group, leading to 
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an output for the group that is smaller than the sum 
of its individual participants. Similarly, in the 
context of a group of shareholders, minority 
shareholders tend to have less incentive to monitor 
investee companies because the rewards of their 
efforts are not enjoyed by themselves alone, but by 
other shareholders benefiting from a free ride 
(Edmans & Holderness, 2017).  
The series of scandals involving accounting 
fraud and falsified data by major Japanese firms 
such as Olympus can be seen not only as 
dysfunctional monitoring by firms with large boards 
of directors including independent directors, but 
also as failures of group decision making: 
Groupthink and a diffusion of responsibility caused 
unjustifiable decisions resulting in frauds, data 
fabrication, and cover-ups. Where diffusion of 
responsibility is concerned, it is often argued that 
the CEO and independent directors were not 
knowledgeable of pertinent facts. As the structure of 
firms becomes more complicated, it is inevitable 
that only a limited percentage of issues deliberated 
on will be reported to management. The more 
abstract become the fields of which each director is 
in charge, the more likely it is that information and 
opinion will be uneven and insufficient, leading to 
diffuse responsibility and improper decisions.  
 
4.2.3. Polarization 
 
It is also well known that opinions tend to be 
polarized in group decision making (Lord et al., 
1979; Myers & Lamm, 1976). In a two-stage 
investment experiment, Staw (1981) shows that 
when an investment goes bad, escalation of 
commitment is more likely when the investor was 
involved in the initial decision than when that was 
not the case. Further, Whyte (1993) shows that such 
tendencies are amplified in groups rather than 
individuals. In an experiment in which groups and 
individuals were asked to judge whether to continue 
or abandon a poorly performing project, 29 per cent 
of individuals and 26 per cent of groups chose to 
continue when the existence of sunk cost was not 
shown, while 69 per cent of individuals and 86 per 
cent of groups chose to continue when sunk cost 
was shown. This indicates that while sunk cost – in 
this case, initial loss from an earlier project – should 
be ignored in making decisions, bias in decision 
making causes people to do so, and thus to take 
greater risks to recover losses already incurred. 
More importantly, this bias is amplified in groups 
compared to individuals, and these tendencies are 
more evident if the results of failure are visible to 
others. To summarize, groups do not serve to 
balance individual biases and errors, but to amplify 
them, leading to polarization through an escalation 
of commitment.  
 
4.2.4. Overconfidence 
 
People, more or less, tend to be overconfident. It is 
known that the sum of self-reported contributions 
to a group exceeds 100 per cent (Ross & Sicoly, 
1979; Savitsky et al., 2005) and that 93 per cent of 
drivers say that their driving skills are above average 
(Svenson, 1981). In comparing group and individual 
performance, Puncochar and Fox (2004) show that 
groups tend to be more confident about wrong 
answers and less so about the correct ones. 
Combined with the pressure to conform and the 
polarization discussed above, overconfidence is 
amplified in groups, rather than being checked and 
bringing balance as might be expected.  
Levi et al. (2013), in looking at M&A, indicate 
that a larger number of female directors lowers the 
frequency of participation in bidding and premiums 
paid, suggesting that female participation mitigates 
overconfidence in boards of directors. This is 
consistent with the findings of Wooley et al. (2010) 
mentioned above.  
These findings of behavioural science show 
that group decision making does not have benefits 
per se, but can actually lower performance. The 
quality of a group’s decision-making performance 
depends on the situation in which the group is 
placed and the nature of the problems it addresses, 
as well as the group’s composition and processes, 
including the social sensitivity of its members (do 
they pay attention to other members, for example). 
And while possibilities have been suggested to 
improve the quality of decision making, no obvious 
general rule exists for the creation of such effective 
measures. As in corporate governance, there is no 
one-size-fits-all answer. To summarize, this section 
shows that there are two sides to group decision 
making: one which produces outcomes exceeding 
those of individuals by integrating diverse expertise 
and insights, as represented by collective 
intelligence; and another which amplifies individual 
biases to produce lower performance, as represented 
by groupthink.  
 
4.3. A theoretical model  
 
Here, we show that the agency model developed by 
Yanagawa (2006) can be extended to a group and 
individual decision model. 
Suppose that shareholders invest capital I with 
an opportunity cost of capital r, form a board of 
directors and delegate management decisions to the 
board. Some measures are necessary in order for 
group decision making to be effective lest it risk 
falling into negative practices such as groupthink. 
Let E be private costs deemed necessary by the 
board of directors, such as expenses to prevent 
groupthink by, for instance, gathering enough 
unbiased information to make objective decisions 
and spending sufficient time listening to all 
members of the board; P
c
 be the probability of 
success when a state c with a high quality of 
decision making is achieved as a result of such 
efforts; and P
g
 (P
c
 > P
g
) be the probability of success 
when a state g with a low quality of decision making 
is brought about as a result of groupthink. If the 
board is successful, the shareholders gain outcome 
Q out of which the board is rewarded with W. If it is 
unsuccessful, neither the shareholders nor the board 
gains anything. Assuming group decision making, 
the state c to bring about a higher probability of 
success is desirable for shareholders, where the 
board produces collective intelligence and achieves 
success. Since the cost E is necessary to realize the 
state c, the condition for the board to have a high-
quality decision making is: 
 
𝑃𝑐𝑊 − 𝐸 ≥ 𝑃𝑔𝑊 (1) 
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The left hand of the equation expresses the 
outcome gained with collective intelligence, and the 
right-hand expresses the outcome gained with the 
harmful effects of groupthink. If the shareholders 
prefer a lower reward W for the board, then:  
 
(𝑃𝑐 − 𝑃𝑔)𝑊 ≥ 𝐸 (2) 
 
From this, the optimal reward W* is:  
 
 𝑊∗ =
𝐸
𝑃𝑐 − 𝑃𝑔
 (3) 
 
The distribution of the outcome (P
c 
Q – E) to the 
shareholders after paying the cost E is: 
 
 𝑃𝑐(𝑄 − 𝑊
∗) = 𝑃𝑐(𝑄 −
𝐸
𝑃𝑐 − 𝑃𝑔
) (4) 
 
And the distribution to the board is:  
 
 𝑃𝑐𝑊
∗ − 𝐸 =
𝑃𝑔
𝑃𝑐 − 𝑃𝑔
𝐸 (5) 
 
The condition for the shareholders to invest is:  
 
𝑃𝑐(𝑄 −
𝐸
𝑃𝑐 − 𝑃𝑔
) ≥ (1 + 𝑟)𝐼 (6) 
 
However, if there is no possibility that group 
decision making will produce harmful effects, it is 
efficient to invest as long as:  
 
𝑃𝑐𝑄 − 𝐸 ≥ (1 + 𝑟)𝐼 (7) 
 
If we compare (6) and (7) by noting that P
c
 > P
g
, 
we see that the threshold for investment is limited 
by the existence of groupthink. This occurs because 
shareholders’ return on investment decreases due to 
the need to distribute to the board of directors more 
than E, the cost of preventing groupthink, as seen in 
(5), a result of the case g, under which the 
probability of success is lower (P
c
 > P
g
). This 
situation resembles underinvestment problems in an 
agency model where the principal needs to increase 
distribution to the agent so as to encourage the 
agent to maintain its efforts, thereby foregoing 
socially efficient investment. By combining (6) 
and (7), we obtain: 
 
𝑃𝑐𝑄 − 𝐸 ≥ (1 + 𝑟)𝐼 > 𝑃𝑐(𝑄 −
𝐸
𝑃𝑐 − 𝑃𝑔
) (8) 
  
If we add the constraint of (6) in particular, we 
see a shelving of socially efficient investment. As 
with an agency model in which shareholders will not 
invest if unable to recover sufficient investment due 
to inadequate efforts by an agent, this can be 
interpreted as shareholders being unwilling to 
supply capital if unable to recover sufficient 
investment due to the existence of groupthink. Here 
it is shown that other things being equal, group 
decision making causes underinvestment problems 
owing to the potential for harm due to groupthink 
and other behavioural problems.  
Additionally, if a board were to have only one 
director, as opposed to the minimum of three 
actually required, we can assume, by denoting the 
possibility of success through decision making by an 
individual with P
s
:  
 
𝑃𝑐 ≥ 𝑃𝑠 > 𝑃𝑔 (9) 
 
In this case, the condition to invest is:  
 
𝑃𝑠𝑄 ≥ (1 + 𝑟)𝐼 (10) 
 
If we compare (7) and (10), it is always true 
when P
c
 = P
s
 that a decision by an individual will 
result in a more desirable investment than that by a 
group. Otherwise it will depend on the relative size 
of P
c
 and P
s
 and the size of E: namely, the difference 
in desirability between the group and individual 
decision making and the cost of bringing collective 
intelligence to group decision making. That group 
decisions are not always desirable is also shown, 
therefore, by behavioural modelling.  
The phenomenon of a board of directors 
becoming a formality can be interpreted as E being 
too large to produce the intended collective 
intelligence, thus turning the board into an entity 
which merely confirms decisions already made 
rather than incurring such costs.  
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
The previous section showed that there are two 
sides to group decision making; that certain 
conditions are needed for collective intelligence to 
emerge; and that a group is subject to the pitfalls of 
groupthink and other biases. The theoretical model 
showed that underinvestment can occur in 
conjunction with groupthink. We derive from these 
findings that group decision making is not always 
appropriate.  
Empirical evidence suggests that, while group 
decision making can have its benefits, there are 
harmful effects as well, and that mandating firms to 
make group decisions obliges them to focus on one 
sort of effect on the assumption that the benefits 
exceed the costs in all firms, regardless of their 
behavioural characteristics and tendencies. There is 
no evidence, however, that this assumption is valid, 
as shown by the empirical studies and the model. 
Some firms derive benefits from group decision 
making; others, however, achieve better governance 
by reducing the number of their directors when the 
negative effects of groupthink, and other negative 
biases of mandated group decisions, are more 
serious than the presumed effects of collective 
intelligence are beneficial. Further, these negative 
factors can cause firms to underinvest, even when 
such investment is socially desirable.  
If Japanese firms were given freedom of choice 
in composing their boards of directors, as is the case 
under Delaware corporate law, the effect on decision 
making would be neutral in the sense that firms with 
a greater likelihood of realizing collective 
intelligence would choose group decisions, while 
those more likely to confront groupthink would 
choose individual decisions. In competing with each 
other, each firm would choose an optimal decision 
model for itself based on its own behavioural 
characteristics and tendencies. As we have already 
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seen, large listed firms already have boards of more 
than three people on average; some are gradually 
increasing the number of independent directors on 
the board with a view toward transitioning to the 
monitoring model of a board under the Corporate 
Governance Code. Therefore, the typical firm this 
paper deals with is one with a director or two 
making substantial decisions, and which desires the 
legal and non-legal benefits of a favourable 
allocation of legal authority to the board of directors 
along with the legal stability and social recognition 
of a corporation with a board of directors. Given 
that a small board will not work for monitoring 
purposes, the company will have an auditor or board 
of auditors dedicated to that task. Examples of such 
companies include newly established subsidiaries 
and joint ventures of large firms, unlisted small and 
medium-sized firms and start-ups, and firms taking 
the form of a special limited liability company (a 
former limited liability company under the old 
Limited Liability Company Act allowed to retain that 
format through grandfathering under the Act on 
Arrangement of Relevant Acts Incidental to 
Enforcement of the Companies Act even after the 
enactment of the Companies Act which succeeded 
and absorbed the old format as corporation).  
Such added flexibility in governance could fit 
with a coincidental change in business and 
technology. Yanagawa (2015) points out that 
business in large firms is actually carried out by 
units of small teams, and that relation-specific 
investment is made at the level of such teams and 
not of the whole organization. If this is true, then a 
large firm’s networks and value are created on the 
small-team level. An economy with a value network 
whose sources lie in the knowledge, experience and 
creativity of small organizations and individuals is 
coherent with a corporate institution which offers a 
high degree of flexibility to individuals and the 
managers of small organizations. If smaller 
organizations make more sense, mandating group 
decision making with a minimum size will not fill 
such needs, and may even become a formality 
offering no beneficial effects.  
In addition, the development of technology 
affects how people view organizations, and new 
organizational forms support technology as an 
institutional infrastructure. Recent developments in 
information technology allow work which has 
required the extensive knowledge and experience of 
individuals to be supported by machines. Machine-
aided decisions by human beings can have the same 
functions as decisions supported by other humans 
with different expertise and experience, as the 
machines will complement the limited information-
processing abilities available to individuals making 
decisions. In cases like these, there is less of a need 
for firms to have plural directors who are natural 
persons on their board of directors (§ 331 (1) 
prescribes that directors be natural persons). Even 
aside from small firms where a board of directors 
can be a formality, it is important for institutions to 
adapt coherently to technological changes which can 
complement the decisions of natural persons. As 
technology and markets continue on a path of rapid 
change, drawing on the knowledge and experience of 
in-house directors may not be enough for firms 
seeking to make the right decisions. It may also 
become harder to find the best human capital to 
make all decisions at all times. In an environment of 
ongoing change, networked knowledge and 
experience are as important to decision making as 
that which is accumulated internally. Technological 
change affects the enhancement of individual 
decision making and the formation of organizations. 
If such a complementary factor in decision making 
exists from a technological viewpoint as well, the 
presumed benefits of mandatory group decision 
making lessen as well, further necessitating a 
flexible structure for governance.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has taken a clause of the Japanese 
Companies Act as a point of departure for a 
discussion of group decision making. The findings 
of behavioural science show that group decision 
making does not necessarily produce a superior 
performance to that by individuals, and rather has 
the potential to cause underinvestment. This implies 
that there is no need to mandate group decision 
making for firms. The paper also discussed the 
possibility that relaxing this rule could lead to the 
creation of new subsidiaries and joint ventures by 
large firms and of new firms by entrepreneurs.  
Institutions evolve with a certain path 
dependency. Under the existing rule, some firms 
might be enjoying the fruits of group decisions in 
the form of greater diversity, for instance, while 
others might be underperforming within a hollowed-
out organizational design. This paper argues that it 
is important to revisit clause § 331 (5) mandating 
group decision making, and give it greater flexibility, 
in light of the diversity of situations and conditions 
that firms face while making decisions. Specifically, 
it is recommended that the clause be amended to “a 
Company with a Board of Directors shall have one or 
more directors”. This will give firms more flexibility 
in composing their boards of directors, thereby 
providing them with options in addressing the 
behavioural issues discussed in this paper based on 
individual firms’ behavioural characteristics and 
tendencies, and resolving the hollowing-out issue by 
substantiating the function of the board in line with 
changes in business activity and technology.  
Japanese corporate law is intended to govern 
corporate activities, and there is much of interest 
left to study – not only from the traditional 
microeconomic perspective but from the behavioural 
point of view as well. This would include the issue of 
effective monitoring to prevent corporate 
misconduct, an important issue for many at a time 
when the interests of individuals are closely 
interwoven with those of groups. It is suggested, for 
example, that female participation in the workplace 
can be an effective condition for achieving collective 
intelligence, but the behavioural processes for this 
outcome are still unclear. Also, because most 
behavioural experiments occur outside of the 
corporate office environment, there is a need to 
review how knowledge develops inside firms and 
how decisions are made in such surroundings. These 
points also comprise the limitations of this research, 
indicating the need for more empirical evidence 
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close to the corporate environment. There could be 
other biases, for instance – including gender bias – 
which are particularly observed in the corporate 
environment as opposed to the general problem-
solving environment found in laboratories. This 
could lead us to find added conditions under which 
collective intelligence or groupthink may emerge. In 
addition, many corporate decisions, whether by 
groups or individuals, are made gradually, by 
furthering ideas and thoughts while collecting 
information and accumulating knowledge with the 
passage of time. Much management knowledge is 
accumulative, evolving bit by bit through the 
addition of new information which must be 
complemented by studies of the internal workings of 
individual firms. Thus, more empirical evidence on 
the aspects of decisions made within a certain time 
span to allow a gradual development of knowledge, 
as opposed to decisions made instantly, would 
provide us with more insights into decisions in the 
corporate environment.  
The effect of listing rules is also significant in 
relation to corporate law. This paper mainly looks at 
relatively small firms that require small boards 
where the minimum requirement for the board can 
be an issue. Listing rules essentially require larger 
boards, or larger groups, than unlisted ones by 
putting greater emphasis on their monitoring role in 
protecting general investors. Thus, more analysis in 
light of the behavioural perspectives on differences 
between the requirements of listing rules and the 
corporate law could offer us a deeper understanding 
of the roles of boards of different sizes, as well as 
the contrast between groups and individuals 
discussed in this paper. Such research would 
address the issues faced by a wider range of firms. 
These are among the rich fields left to future 
research on corporate boards from a new, 
behavioural perspective.  
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